Previous work on soccer wages finds that some European leagues place higher than expected values on players from South America. The same case could be argued for Major League Soccer (MLS), which has previously expressed a desire to impress Hispanic markets through player acquisitions. Contrary to previous work, this paper focuses on the rank of a player's nationality, rather than assuming all players from one continent represent similar backgrounds. Using data available through the MLS, MLS Player's Union, and FIFA, linear and quantile regression techniques estimate wage premiums for a player's nationality rank to uncover possible customer or owner discrimination. Players' countries are ranked within each continent into either "top countries" or "bottom countries," then compared across different specifications. Wage premiums ranged from 30% to 130% for the majority of top ranking countries within North America, Europe, and Africa, while certain South American countries earned wage discounts depending on their country's rank.
1 Introduction "The phrase 'Brazilian soccer player' is like the phrases 'French chef' or 'Tibetan monk.' The nationality expresses an authority, an innate vocation for the job-whatever the natural ability." Alex Bellos, author of Futebol: The Brazilian Way of Life A Brazilian agent told Alex Bellos a story about exporting Brazilian players overseas, "It's sad to say, but it is much easier selling, for example, a crap Brazilian than a brilliant Mexican. The Brazilian gets across the image of happiness, party, carnival. Irrespective of talent, it is very seductive to have a Brazilian in your team." There are a number of individual issues involved in the labor negotiation process, but the majority, if not all, focus on salaries, salary caps, and player benefits. Once an owner has a clear idea of their budget for a given number of years, salary negotiations can take place with the assurance of a season to follow.
Players often feel underpaid, owners feel the opposite, and fans are usually stuck somewhere in between. Researchers have varying opinions on player pay, but the majority follow the "superstar status" foundation, which bases a player's future earnings on expected productivity. Expected productivity is most often captured by using a player's previous season statistics to gauge future success. The goal of this paper is to examine player valuation using manager and customer preferences to gauge the marketability of certain nationalities. We examine how a player's nationality ranks relative to his peers, rather than assuming collective characteristics among people from the same continent. Rankings are a popular tool across many different areas of labor economics, but it appears to be absent from the sports economic literature. Rankings in education are often used to measure the impact of school quality on future earnings, and find that a portion of future earnings are due to individual potential. Unlike rankings in the educational literature, soccer players send signals based on their nationality, which is beyond their control. This unchosen signal, like race, is not indicative of a player's ability. The paper is outlined in the following way: Section 2 identifies the motivation behind the topic, Section 3 looks at previous literature on measuring the value of athletes, Section 4 provides the theoretical foundation, Section 5 describes the data, Section 6 lists the empirical specifications and assumptions, Section 7 contains the results and their intuition, while Section 8 concludes and provides further research.
Motivation
Previous work in soccer salary estimation characterizes athletes from different geographic regions based on continental association or regionalized zones within their continent. Just as individual states are unique from one another, countries differ from each other within a continent. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the governing body of international soccer, ranks over 204 countries on a monthly basis based on the performance of a county's national team in international competitions. This ranking serves as a proxy measure of the soccer "culture" in a particular country. Just as India is well known for cricket, Australia for rugby, and the United States for basketball, FIFA's rankings help discover which countries are renowned for producing quality soccer players. Using this knowledge, we estimate a player's nationality premium simply from country association, regardless of whether they actually play for their country's national team.
Prior studies grouping players by continent make a strong, yet often unwritten, assumption that the continent is homogenous across countries. While in fact many fans may see players from South America as all Hispanic, a player's nationality is unique to their country. By breaking continents into more specific regions, we address some of the heterogeneity in the area. Ideally, a continent-specific variable would be used, but the sample size in most studies is not sufficient for that level of specificity. Considering the data we introduce later, there are some countries with only one or two representatives, while the average county (excluding USA) has between five and six representatives. Using country specific fixed effects with such a small sample would result in biased estimators because of outliers. Yang and Lin (2012) attempt to measure salary discrimination in the National Basketball Association (NBA) by using the gross domestic product (GDP) and the existence of a domestic league within a player's home country to measure the effect on a player's salary. The GDP approach simply implies that there exist other alternatives in place for players in their home country outside of basketball, while the presence of a home league is ambiguous since the NBA is considered the best league in the world. Both measures ignore the quality of a player's domestic league in their salary estimation. The ranked approach, which has yet to be explored in the sports literature, assumes that countries in the top half, third, or fourth of their continent are viewed as more similar to each other than countries in the bottom half, two-thirds, or three-fourths. While heterogeneity may still be present among the ranked system, it is greatly reduced from the assumption that all countries in the continent are similar, and more practical than applying individual country-specific fixed effects.
Given Major League Soccer's unique structure, the league manages all player contracts, rather than at the teamlevel in an attempt to limit rapid growth of player salaries that doomed the North American Soccer League 1 .
Still lacking a significant national television contract, MLS relies heavily on gate revenue, which may or may not be a function of player nationalities. If clubs appeal to fan preferences, we should continue to see the number of international players increase to capitalize on fan preferences, however, statistical discrimination may put higher values on certain discrimination.
Literature Review
The wage literature in the sports arena is fairly in-depth and spans multiple approaches. Before and after the Sabermetrics phenomenon went public, authors focused on measuring the production inputs of a player and measured their output as either contributions to winning or their salary. Seminal work in labor economics by Rosen (1981) 
Theoretical Foundation
Similar to soccer around the world, Major League Soccer teams bid for talent in a competitive market, with a high degree of mobility throughout the world. Unlike most international leagues, MLS teams are weakly constrained by a salary cap 2 . With a highly competitive international labor markets and a competitive utility maximizing firm, hiring bias may still exist based on customer preferences, but owner preferences or co-worker discrimination cannot remain (Becker, 1971) . Teams that acknowledge this pressure can be rewarded through increased attendance, television revenue, and merchandise if they obtain the players that fans want to see (Kahn, 1991) .
Consider a general manager that must chose between two identical players. The traditional profit maximization condition implies that a player's wage is equal to the value of their marginal product of labor. A team's profit function is the difference between a team's revenue, which is based on overall player talent level and costs, which are the sum of player wage bills for a given amount of talent. For two identical players with equal amounts of talent, the general manager should be indifferent. 
where a firm's profit function is comprised of revenue generated by playing performance, w i , as well as fan preferences for domestic talent (d i , and the cost associated with acquiring talent. The share of domestic talent
A nationality bias would alter marginal costs such that a club's management must pay a premium for domestic talent because the preferences of owners or fans discount certain talent. If a nationality bias was not present, we expect no wage premiums to exist. However, a nationality bias alters the marginal cost of talent such that
where s * represents the share of talent in the labor pool that is available to be hired and c i0 is the constant marginal cost of talent if no nationality bias occurs.
Expanding equation (1) by substituting equation (2), we express the club's utility function as:
The first order conditions for club i are:
and
where subscripts represent partial derivatives. To solve for the optimal level of talent, subtract equation (6) from equation (5), and reduce to:
If management had no nationality preferences, β = 0, the share of domestic talent on the team is indeterminate, but would be no more than s * . If management has nationality preferences, the domestic share, s i , would be larger than the talent share available in the talent pool. To compensate for the increase demand in the a limited amount of talent, the marginal cost of that talent increases. The last term shows the relationship between the optimal share of talent given the marginal revenue of winning with that talent (R w w d ) and the additional marginal revenue generated from fan preferences (R d ). If fans were indifferent between nationalities, such that the share of nationality would have no effect on marginal winning, the entire right term collapses to zero.
Hypothesis 1: Fans and/or owners have a preference for domestic players over foreign players.
In order to fulfill management's nationality preferences, clubs must be willing to pay a higher price per unit of domestic talent hired. The same concept can be extended beyond domestic and foreign talent into any realm where fans or owners may have preferences for one group versus another 4 . To start, if owners are more likely biased in favor of their consumers' nationalities, Canadian teams would offer premiums for Canadian players, whereas teams from the United States would offer premiums for players from the United States. Using ordinary least squares, these collective nationality preferences, along with preferences for USA players or preferences for
North American players, are tested in by collecting nationality information by continent.
Hypothesis 2: Fans and/or owners prefer talent from "soccer rich" countries over "soccer poor"
countries. If fans actually prefer foreign players to domestic players, we should expect to see premiums or discounts based on regions, which has previously been examined by Kuethe and Motamed (2010) , who found that South American players earned wage premiums in Major League Soccer. Following their logic, as well as
Wilson and Ying (2003) who found premiums for Brazilians, we posit that owners or fans have a preference for specific types of countries within regions, rather than regions as a whole. The foundation of this research revolves around the notion that fans actually prefer subcategories of regions, rather than regions as a whole.
Hypothesis 3: Discrimination only occurs in certain quantiles of the salary range. Toward the end of Kuethe and Motamed (2010), they present the case that superstars have a greater effect at the end of a salary distribution than at the beginning. Likewise, players may already be sorted into classes based on their talent level, in which case, quantile regression could uncover preferences hidden in certain ranges. For teams looking to acquire high valued players, their marketability is important from a return on investment standpoint. If management can increase their marginal revenue from hiring a "preferred" region, we should expect nationality rankings to be significant in the higher quantiles. For a team looking to fill a back-up position and spend near the league minimum on a player, their marketability may not be paramount, in which case, the rank of the player's nationality is expected to be insignificant.
Data
The data was collected from three primary sources, the first being the MLS Player's Union ( The initial data set comprised nearly 1,500 observations across 18 different MLS teams. However, the set was 5 The correlation between guaranteed compensation and base salary is .883
parsed to include only players who were on an MLS team in the previous season and eliminated goalkeepers from the set 6 . Roughly 45% of active players in the league have no MLS experience, however the average tenure in our sample is roughly three and a half years after including only players with at least one year of
experience. This refinement left the data set with 838 total observations for a repeated cross-sectional study.
The second source of data comprises a player's previous season statistics, which were collected from the MLS website (Soccer, March 2011). Their performance was converted into per-game measures for ease of comparison across years and players.
Player nationalities are recorded from their declared nationality, which is publicly available (Strack-Zimmermann, March 2011). Players wanting to change nationality are barred from international competition for a set period of time, and may only represent one nationality at a time. For this study, we consider a player's declared nationality to be exogenous 7 . The only confederation not represented in our sample is the Oceania Football Conference (OFC) because only one player qualified under our requirements, and was thus removed from the sample. The final data set added FIFA rankings for each nationality, which were recorded at March, prior to the season, which would represent the most recent rankings just prior to the start of the MLS regular season.
In actuality, there is little difference between any two or three consecutive months, but rankings between years may vary slightly.
Empirical Specifications
We modify the standard wage equation slightly, but stay within the extensions developed by Kuethe and Motamed (2010) on estimating sports wage salaries:
Where P LAY ER l,t represents a vector of player specific variables, including position dummies for whether a player played forward (FORWARD) or midfield (MIDFIELD), and 0 for both indicating a defender. The standard variables of age (AGE) and age-squared (AGESQ) as well as tenure (MLSEXP) and tenure-squared (MLSEXPSQ) are included in the model. Tenure represents the number of consecutive years the player had previously played in Major League Soccer. We expect the age factor to have a bigger impact for two reasons.
The first is that age captures a level of general experience in the soccer world, specifically for players that play within multiple leagues across their careers. A unique system in professional soccer that is absent from other professional leagues is the presence of transfers and loans. Players can be sent to other leagues during their host league's offseason for training. This complicates the estimation of the number of years of experience because some players "bounce" between leagues on loan while waiting for their primary host league to resume play.
Major League Soccer records data only when players are present in their league, and not for other leagues, including the lower levels of the US Pyramid 8 . Players may play in MLS for two seasons, be traded overseas to a European league for three seasons, and come back to MLS for one season. Under this scenario, MLS only records data for the three seasons the player was in their league. The absent data could represent a player overseas or a player who suffered a major injury and was not signed to a contract. For these two primary reasons, experience is limited to include the number of consecutive years prior to the season.
We use lagged statistics as a measure of the player's expected ability for the upcoming season, where P ERF l,t−1 is a vector of those performance measures. Since player contracts begin before the season starts, using data to assemble a measure of a player's home country relative to others. We create dichotomous variables for each confederation within FIFA to take the value of 1 if a player is from a country which ranks in the top section of each confederation, and 0 otherwise. This measure will show if players from high ranking (soccer rich) countries earn wage premiums relative to their counterparts from lower ranking (soccer poor) countries, which will answer variations on our second hypothesis.
The final piece of our estimation approach captures team and year fixed effects for each player for the year they signed their contract. of their players from outside the country.
Results

Preferences for Countries and Regions
We start the estimation using ordinary least squares regression techniques, but correct for heteroskedastic errors using White's (1980) correction 9 . The first step of our process is to replicate the results of Kuethe & Motamed (K&M) using updated data from the 2010-2012 seasons, which can be found in Table 4 . Originally, K&M hypothesize that MLS was a league that rewarded young players relative to their elder counterparts, which is opposite of traditional labor markets. Our results shows that MLS may actually be correcting itself and moving toward a more traditional view of age and experience in the labor market. Our first result actually provides a slight preview into our future models and reveals that the addition of four teams since their 2008 study may have made the market for players slightly more competitive, which resulted in some variables losing significance. With our updated data set, we find that wage premiums for South Americans lose significance, while premiums/discounts for Europe, Africa, and the Caribbean become significant
To explore the results of ranking nationalities, we break the hypotheses into multiple sections, with progressively increasing divisions of nationality. Hypothesis 1 assumes domestic players are paid differently than their foreign counterparts. Model (1) in Table 5 shows the initial results of whether domestic players are paid a premium relative to foreigners. The binary variable DOM EST IC shows no significant wage differences between domestic and foreign players. Our results differ from that of Lucifora and Simmons (2003) American players earn roughly 12% less than foreign players from outside North American (CONCACAF). This result is confirmed later when players are evaluated by region based on the rank of their nationality.
To further investigate Hypothesis 1, we exploit various measures of nationality from previous literature to see if isolating North Americans has a significant effect on their wages. Model (3) in Table 5 compares only North
Americans to see if there are regional differences among Americans, Canadians, Mexicans, and players from "other CONCACAF nations," which is labeled CAR in the model. Nationality variables represent the wage difference between a player from that country and a player from the United States. When evaluating players from North America (roughly 76% of the sample), wage discounts begin to emerge. Given a level of past performance, players from Canada and Caribbean nations earn between 25% and 40% less than their American counterparts. Mexican player wages were not significantly different from American players. This reaffirms the motivation that collective nationalities based on continents are ill-suited to explain the size of the effect of nationalities on wages.
Model (4) compares individual continents, along with regions in CONCACAF, against players from the United
States, which is similar to the most recent work in soccer wage literature by Kuethe and Motamed (2010) . In this expanded model, we see significant wage premiums and discounts relative to Americans across the globe.
Players from Europe (UEFA) and Africa (CAF) earn wage premiums relative to Americans, while players from Oceania (OFC) and Asia (AFC) suffer discounts. South Americans earn no premium, which is consistent with our results using the K&M specification.
Across the four models, superstar effects play a significant role in the determination of a player's salary, as well as performance variables of assists and goals per game, which is consistent with many previous studies.
The age variable's negative coefficient (albeit insignificant in most cases) and the positive coefficient with MLS experience is consistent with work by Kuethe and Motamed (2010) who found that the MLS player pool is made up of young players with a few years of experience and older players who come from abroad with little to no MLS experience. Superstars have strong and positive premiums given their past performance, which has been consistent across the literature in Europe and North America. Overall, it appears that players from Canada and the Caribbean earn wage discounts relative to their American counterparts.
Preferences for Ranked Regions
To explore ranked nationalities, we move to Tables 6, 7, It appears that players who represent the top countries in CONCACAF earn a significant wage premium of 41% to 134% premium relative to their counterparts in lower rankings. This implies that either fans or owners place high premiums on players from top ranked countries. This is consistent with the results from Table (5), which showed that players from Caribbean nations had the largest wage discounts relative to players from the United
States. Players from the top half of CONCACAF typically hail from the United States, Mexico, Jamaica, and Costa Rica. Table 7 only shows signifiant wage premiums for players from the top third of UEFA. Players hailing from countries like England, Germany, Spain, and Italy earn 110% more than players from lower ranked countries.
Even though the ranked nationality approach is only significant in the top third of UEFA, the constant values are significantly higher than those of CONCACAF (50% or higher on average), which coincides with the results from Model (4) in Table ( 5) that showed all Europeans earning wage premiums around 30% higher than players from the United States. 
Collective Preferences
A third alternative to the ranking system was instituted, which groups everyone together, and measures how a player's country ranked within the entire FIFA sample. Table 10 shows the division of players based on different rankings in FIFA. It could be possible that fans do not actually recognize nationalities based on continents, but are able to recognize which countries are the best in the world.
Nearly all players represent a country in the top half of FIFA, but very few represent top 10 or top 20 countries.
As the classification of a player's country narrows to include only the best teams in the world, the measure of top rank becomes significant for the top third, top quarter, and top twenty teams. Players from the top 10 countries may be experiencing the same effect as discussed with players from CONMEBOL. Players from Top 20 countries earn approximately 8.8% more than other nationalities, but not significantly different for Top 10 players.
Preferences Across the Salary Range
The final approach in Table 11 takes a simultaneous quantile regression approach to measure the effect of our variables at different salary levels. Previous work by Kuethe and Motamed (2010) explored the quantile regression for only a selected set of quantiles, but we expand the selection to include the bottom three quantiles, the top three quantiles, as well as the median. Quantile regression makes the assumption that players are endogenously clustered around salary levels because the owners know something about their "true skill level."
By using quantile regression, we can focus on the conditional median of a given quantile (rather than a conditional mean for OLS regression). This allows us to find the factors that influence the median for a given quantile. By using this method, we seek to uncover nationality preferences at different levels. If owners are looking to purchase a $500,000 player, they may be interested in choosing a nationality that is marketable, whereas spending the league minimum to fill a roster spot would not require an investment in the players' marketability.
We use a liberal measure of ranking for the quantile regression, controlling for confederations, the regions in North America, and a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a player's nationality is in the top half of their confederation. We find that the ranking of a player's nationality never becomes significant across any level of the salary scale, but various variables change significance depending on which area is targeted.
Performance measures matter most in lower quantiles, while a player's superstar status matters most in upper quantiles. Although the rank of nationalities is insignificant across quantiles, nationalities do matter for higher quantiles.
Conclusion & Future Research
This study fills a gap in the discrimination literature by exploring a more detailed measure of nationality for specific industry. Rankings have been used in various categories across other labor and education economics topics, but not in sports. While previous studies ignore the heterogeneity among countries within continents, the ranked nationality approach attempts to cluster top performing countries together. Throughout the results, various clusters were found to exhibit what appears to be the effect of customer or owner discrimination. The only other study to evaluate Major League Soccer found wage premiums for players from South America. After extending the sample to include additional years of data, wage premiums for players from top countries ranged from 30% to 134% deadening on the confederation. The most unique result may be the wage discounts associated with players from South America. Overall, South Americans do not earn significantly different wages compared with players from the United States, but within the continent, top ranked countries suffer wage discounts.
However, when looking at South Americans in the quantile regression, it appears that only players already in the top earnings categories are earning premiums from being South American. This may explain why previous studies found support for South Americans earning wage premiums, which may have outliers in small sample sizes.
Some of the differences between the current study and previous literature that explored Europe may be a function of league structure. Overall, Major League Soccer is perhaps a more balanced league because of league design. Because of their setup, superstar premiums may be deflated relative to European leagues, while nationality premiums for some groups may be inflated. For example, Brazilians have routinely been found to garner wage premiums in Europe, while the current study shows that Brazilians (relative to lower countries in South America) earn wage discounts. Overall, the top Brazilian players are playing in leagues at home or be untrue for the lower ranked countries, whose best players are coming to MLS as a springboard. This shift slightly more homogenous collection of talent (relative to European leagues) allows for a better test of nationality premiums than unconstrained clubs who can spend millions for players.
More work in expanding this intensity measures or ranked a nationalities for other sports, or for different years in
Major League Soccer may provide fruitful insight to their effect on wages. Conveniently, international basketball also provides ranking categories through the Fédération Internationale de Basketball Association (FIBA), which could be an area of potential exploration. Table 3 . † † In K&M's original study, they only used one season of data for their estimation. The updated approach makes use of three seasons of data, so year dummies were included. * * * 1% Significance level. * * 5% Significance level. * 10% Significance level. (1) represents the effect of comparing domestic players against all other foreign players on a team. Model (2) compares players in sub-classes of North America against all other foreign players to measure if fans/owners prefer North American players. Model (3) investigates if a premium is paid to players from the USA compared to all other North American sub-classes. Model (4) divides the sample into North American sub-classes and continents to measure wage differences compared with players from the USA. (1) compares players from countries ranked in the top half of their confederation against players from countries ranked in the bottom half of their confederation. Model (2) compares players from countries ranked in the top one-third of their confederation against players from countries ranked in the bottom two-thirds of their confederation. Model (3) compares players from countries ranked in the top one-quarter of their confederation against players from countries ranked in the bottom three-quarters of their confederation. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis * * * 1% significance level * * 5% significance level * 10% significance level Model (1) compares players from countries ranked in the top half of their confederation against players from countries ranked in the bottom half of their confederation. Model (2) compares players from countries ranked in the top one-third of their confederation against players from countries ranked in the bottom two-thirds of their confederation. Model (3) compares players from countries ranked in the top one-quarter of their confederation against players from countries ranked in the bottom three-quarters of their confederation. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. DP, ALLSTAR, and MLSXI were dropped because there were no observations. TopQuarter could not be computed because no one fell into that category. * * * 1% significance level * * 5% significance level * 10% significance level Model (1) compares players from countries ranked in the top half of their confederation against players from countries ranked in the bottom half of their confederation. Model (2) compares players from countries ranked in the top one-third of their confederation against players from countries ranked in the bottom two-thirds of their confederation. Model (3) compares players from countries ranked in the top one-quarter of their confederation against players from countries ranked in the bottom three-quarters of their confederation. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. * * * 1% significance level * * 5% significance level * 10% significance level Model (1) compares players from countries ranked in the top half of their confederation against players from countries ranked in the bottom half of their confederation. Model (2) compares players from countries ranked in the top one-third of their confederation against players from countries ranked in the bottom two-thirds of their confederation. Model (3) compares players from countries ranked in the top one-quarter of their confederation against players from countries ranked in the bottom three-quarters of their confederation. 
